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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. 78-2-
2(3)(j). On July 17, 2003 the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to 
the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues to be determined by the Appellate Court chiefly resolve 
around whether a mechanics lien that may have a facial deficiency 
prescribed by statute can be declared a Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9-1. 
Appellant believes that in the process of the case that the court made several 
reversible errors, including; declaring a mechanics lien wrongful, Granting 
summary judgment without a motion for such being before the court, 
Granting summary judgment for $3000 when no evidence was ever 
presented to move judgment from the $1000 prescribed by statute to $3000 
prescribed under certain conditions, awarding cost and attorney fees related 
to pursuing damages under mechanics lien statute when the issues from 
mechanics lien statues were dismissed, and changing the amount of a 
previous award of attorney fees without any reason or factual basis. 
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DETERMINATIVE ISSUES 
a. Issue Number One: First Issue to be determined by the 
Court is whether a Mechanics Lien that may be Facially Invalid 
by failing to meet one of the steps outlined in Mechanics Lien 
statute becomes a Wrongful Lien pursuant to UCA. 38-9-1, and 
therefore subject to the summary proceedings provided in Utah 
Code Ann. 38-9-7. This Issue calls for statutory interpretation 
and thus presents a question of law which should be reviewed 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. 
b. Issue Number Two: Whether a Mechanics Lien 
filed pursuant to UCA 38-1-3, but failed to state the time work 
started and stopped per UCA 38-1-7, should be declared void. 
This presents a correction of error becaus,; the issue is in 
conflict with previous appellate rulings in that "failure to 
comply with statutory requirement for notice of mechanic's lien 
will be viewed as technical, and will be upheld in absence of 
any prejudice, unless failures have compromised a purpose of 
the Mechanics Lien statute." Projects Unlimited v. Copper 
State Thrift 798 P.2d 738. (Utah 1990) 
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c. Issue Number Three: Whether Trial Court was in error in 
awarding attorneys fees under the Wrongful Lien statute for the 
entire case, when much of the work done by Appellee(s) 
counsel was done to obtain damages through the Mechanics 
Lien statute and those charges were dismissed. The standard of 
review is actually a rule of law and not a finding of fact. Court 
of Appeals will grant deference to the fact finder only when the 
findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the 
evidentiary basis for the Courts decision. Woodward v. Fazio, 
823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991). 
d. Issue Number Four: Whether Trial Court was in error in 
awarding additional fees already ruled excessive from first 
award of fees, without any additional finding that Plaintiff was 
somehow now done work to deserve the additional fees. The 
standard of review is actually a rule of law and not a finding of 
fact. Court of Appeals will grant deference to the fact finder 
only when the findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to 
disclose the evidentiary basis for the Courts decision. 
e. Issue Number Five: Whether the trial court was in error in 
awarding $3000 dollars in damages pursuant to the Wrongful 
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Lien statute through a summary judgment when there was a 
material dispute of fact related to Statute that grants court right 
to award $3000 damages, as provided in UCA 38-9-4. This 
Issue calls for statutory interpretation and thus presents a 
question of law which should be reviewed for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
ISSUE NUMBER SIX: Whether court was in error in granting 
Summary Judgment on claims for Wrongful Lien when no 
motion for summary judgment existed. Rule 56(c) of Rules of 
Civil Procedure state "(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. 
The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and 
served in accordance with CJA 4-501." No Motion was 
made by Appellee(s) and as such this also becomes a rule of 
Law and should be reviewed for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial courts legal conclusions. 
ISSUE NUMBER SEVEN: Whether court was in error 
when it denied Appellant the right to amend response to include 
a counter claim against Appellee(s). The Motion was filed on 
the grounds that new evidence had been found that could not 
have been known about at the time of the original filing of the 
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response. This is an issue of discretion on the part of the trial 
court. Court denied motion for amendment on the grounds that 
the Appellee(s) had already submitted a proposed final order 
and court had subsequently signed such. If court determines 
that Wrongful Lien statute is not appropriate disposition to the 
facts of this case, Appellant should have been allowed to file 
Counter Claim as it was needed to defend against Damages 
being sought under Mechanics Lien statute. "Rule 15(a) of 
Utah 'Rules of Civil Procedure permits the amendment of 
pleadings by leave of the court, and the rule is to be liberally 
construed so as to further the interests of Justice ..." Girard v. 
Appleby 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). "When holder of 
mechanics lien brings action to enforce lien through 
counterclaim and principle claim would defeat lien claim, 
successful defense must necessarily be considered for purpose 
of awarding attorneys fees under Mechanics Lien statute". 
First General Services v. Perkins 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 
1996). This issue is an issue of discretion and as such a 
correction of error but because this is a summary judgment all 
findings of the court should be review as conclusions of law 
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and should be reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to 
the trial courts legal conclusions Bonhan v. Morgan 788 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1989).. This issue is brought up only because if 
Appellate Court agrees that wrongful lien statute is not 
appropriate in this case, Appellant would need counter claim to 
continue defense of Mechanics Lien claims on the part of 
Appellee(s). 
h. ISSUE NUMBER EIGHT: Whether Appellee(s) should be 
further bared from seeking damages under the Mechanics Lien 
statute as the Petition to Nullify Lien that was filed by 
Appellee(s) on May 2, 2002 was brought under Wrongful Lien 
statute. If the Appellate Court decides that Wrongful Lien 
statute was not an appropriate disposition to this case then 
Appellee(s) should forever be barred from seeking damages 
under the Mechanics Lien statute as the appropriate way to have 
an invalid Mechanics Lien dismissed is prescribed by UCA 38-
1-28 in which an alternate security is to be provided in an 
amount of 150% of the lien amount. No Alternate security was 
provided and Subsequent to the ruling of Court on June 17, 
2002 Appellant released said lien and can not have it re-instated 
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and has lost most of the rights associated with holding a lien. 
Because of the time transpired those rights can not be 
reinstated. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant filed a Mechanics Lien on a Residence owned by 
Appellee(s) Edson and Sharon Packer. The Mechanics lien was for work 
and material done and furnished by both Appellant Earl Cline and his 
then wife Julie, the daughter of Appellee(s). The work was for a Giant 
Mural hand painted in the children's room. The Mural was over 40 feet 
long and close to ten feet high. Although much of the work on the mural 
was done by Appellants then wife, both sides agreed that Appellant him 
self had done "some work" on the painting. Appellant believed that 
because of a partnership with wife Julie and because both Appellant and 
Julie were told that when they were finished with the painting that they 
would be paid for it by Appellee, Mrs. Packer, that he had a right to lien 
the home for the unpaid work. A lien was filed in the amount of $70,300. 
A Notice was sent from Appellee(s) Counsel Shawn Turner stating 
that they believed that the lien was a Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9-1, 
giving Appellant 20 days to remove the lien. Appellant believed the lien 
was valid and failed to remove said lien. A hearing was held in Fourth 
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District court on June 17, 2002. The Judge stated at the very first that 
"this is most assuredly not a Wrongful Lien", but preceded with the 
hearing. During questing by the Judge, Appellant admitted that the lien 
didn't state the date work started and stopped on the project. Appellant 
also admitted that there wasn't a notice required if the lien was on a 
"Owner Occupied Residence". There is a dispute as to whether the work 
done on Appellee(s) home would require the notice. Appellant disputed 
the allegation that the lien was not timely. The Court ordered that the lien 
was void, but at the time didn't state that the lien was Wrongful. Later 
after a disagreement about whether attorney fees could be awarded under 
the Mechanics Lien statute the court ordered that the fees be awarded 
under the Wrongful Lien statute. 
After some discovery Appellee(s) motioned for a summary judgment on 
all causes including wrongful lien and damages per the Mechanics Lien 
statute, and Punitive Damages. Court rejected the motion for summary 
judgment and stated that no punitive damages could be awarded as both 
statutes provided a form of punitive damages. Court also stated that 
Appellee(s) would have to pursue damages under one section or the other, 
but they were prevented from seeking damages under both statutes. Several 
months later Appellee(s) filed a Motion for relief from order and it was 
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denied, but court issued a memorandum of decision that stated that if 
Appellee(s) filed for summary judgment on only the wrongful lien statute, 
that court would grant such a motion. The motion was never filed but 
Appellee(s) simply submitted a final order and judgment for review. The 
failure to file the motion prohibited Appellant from arguing whether the 
court should award the $1000 damages or the $3000 which would depend 
upon the evidences presented. At about the same time Appellant submitted a 
counter claim and Petition to grant permission to file counterclaim. 
Permission was not granted because a couple of weeks later Court signed 
final order presented by Appellee(s). A motion to amend was filed by 
Appellant and that was denied by court. The Appellant has appealed the 
decision to the Supreme Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues the among other things, Courts decision that 
mechanics lien was facially invalid and as such became a wrongful lien is in 
error as it conflicts with numerous court of appeals cases as well as state 
statutes. Appellant argues that decision to grant summary judgment based 
upon Wrongful lien statute was wrong because; 1. Issues should have been 
handled under the mechanics lien statute, and 2. Because court granted 
summary judgment of $3000 when testimony and argument were not able to 
13 
establish that Appellant was guilty of any type of fraud or had any 
knowledge that the lien was wrongful at the time of filing. Therefore even if 
Wrongful lien statute is appropriate to case, judgment should have been only 
$1000. Appellant argues that court abused discretion in granting attorneys 
fees for the entire case, when Appellant clearly prevailed on Mechanics lien 
issues and those fees should have been removed from any award of attorneys 
fees. Finally Appellant argues that court abused discretion by allowing 
Appellee to skip several steps needed to grant summary judgment, which 
prejudiced Appellant in his defense of the case. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
The First issue to be determined is whether a mechanics lien that may 
have a deficiency that is required from the mechanics lien statute is a 
Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9. Appellee argued originally that Appellant 
was not entitled to file a Mechanics Lien. UCA 38-1-3 states the following 
are entitled to file a mechanics lien, "Contractors, subcontractors, and all 
persons performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or 
equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and 
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, 
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
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superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or 
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning 
which they have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented 
materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as the lien 
is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction and 
Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the 
owner may have in the property." (emphasis added) 
Both parties agreed that Appellant had done "some work". In addition 
Appellant testified that he had provided materials to the project. Even if 
Appellant wasn't entitled to lien for the work that his then wife had done, he 
still had the right to lien for the work that he had done. It is clear that 
Appellant was "entitled" to file a mechanics lien as per Statute. The dispute 
would then be the value of the work done and if the lien overstated that 
value. The dispute of value would clearly be handled within the mechanics 
lien section and there would not be any reason to have the mechanics lien 
declared a Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9. 
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The Appellee(s) suggested that the lien overstated the value of the 
work. Appellee Edson Packer stated in his affidavit that his daughter and 
Appellants then wife Julie painted the painting. Appellant testified through 
affidavits that Appellee, Sharon Packer had promised to pay both Julie and 
Appellant for the work when it was completed. During one conversation 
Julie and Appellee Sharon Packer, agreed that the value of the painting 
would have been over $60,000. Appellant testified that not only was he told 
that he would be paid for the work when it was done, but that his wife Julie 
and himself were involved in a partnership which would give Appellant the 
right to file the lien for the work that both he and his then wife had done. 
Again not a valid reason to have this lien declared Wrongful under UCA 38-
9. 
At the June 17, 2002 hearing, the Court made the statement from the 
bench that "well, let me just make this comment. I've has several of these 
types of hearings. The definition, the definition of a wrongful lien, you 
know is, basically states that a, a wrongful lien is a lien that is not 
authorized by law or not signed by the owners of the, of the property. 
Clearly a mechanic's lien is authorized by law. It might, you know, and 
I understand that you allege that Mr. Cline, that the lien might be 
groundless. But it's clearly not a wrongful lien, is k?" At that point the 
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court asked Appellant if the lien stated the time work started and stopped, 
and he admitted that it didn't. Appellant was then asked if the lien included 
the notice as required by statute for a owner occupied residence and he 
admitted that it didn't. There was a question as to whether the lien was 
timely and Appellant disputed that argument and even stated to court as to a 
time frame of when the work stopped. In subsequent argument to the court 
Appellant was able to show that the notice required by statute for owner 
occupied home only applies in a situation where a contractor is hired by 
written contract to build an owner occupied new home. 
"PROTECTION AGAINST LIENS AND CIVIL ACTION. 
Notice is hereby provided in accordance with Section 38-11-
108 of the Utah Code that under Utah law an "owner" may 
be protected against liens being maintained against an 
"owner-occupied residence" and from other civil action 
being maintained to recover monies owed for "qualified 
services" performed or provided by suppliers and 
subcontractors as a part of this contract, if and only if the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) the owner entered into a written contract an original 
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contractor, a factory built housing retailer, or a real estate 
developer; 
(2) the original contractor was properly licensed or exempt 
from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act at the time the contract 
was executed; and 
(3) the owner paid in full the original contractor, factory 
built housing retailer, or real estate developer or their 
successors or assigns in accordance with the written 
contract and any written or oral amendments to the 
contract. 
Failure to include this language on the Notice of Lien may 
result in lien foreclosure being denied. Additionally, every lien 
claimant is required to provide to the homeowner instruction 
on how to gain protection from the lien under the Act and a 
form answer, affidavit, and motion for summary judgment as 
part of the lien foreclosure action documents (Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 38-1-1 l(4)(a)). Failure to provide the form will result in the 
foreclosure action being denied." 
Clearly the only issue that may entitle the court to determine that the 
lien filed is a Wrongful Lien per UCA 38-9 is the failure to state the date 
work stopped and started. 
In researching for this appeal Appellant searched at great length for a 
case similar to this. The only case found was a Washington Supreme Court 
Case PATRICK v. BONTHIUS 124 P.2d 550, in which the court 
determined that direct testimony by contractor as to date on which work was 
completed was sufficient to show the time when the last work and materials 
were furnished. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled a number of times on 
issues regarding the purported facial deficiencies in a Mechanics lien, 
although not specifically to the issue of the date and time work started and 
stopped. 
In PARK CITY MEAT CO. et al. V. COMSTOCK SILVER 
MINING CO. et al. 103 p. 254 (Utah Supreme 1909) the Court ruled that 
"Where there has been a substantial compliance with the Statute creating a 
mechanics lien, and the lien has in fact been established, the lien will not be 
defeated by mere technicalities or nice distinctions". In PROJECTS 
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UNLIMITED v, COPPER STATE THRIFT 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990), 
The court ruled; "We begin our analysis by recognizing that "the 
purpose of mechanic's lien act is remedial in nature and seeks to 
provide protection to laborers and materialmen who have added 
directly to the value of the property of another by their materials or 
labor." Calder Bros Co. v. Anderson, 652 P. 2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). On 
the other hand, we recognize that liens create "an encumbrance on 
property that deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear title and 
impairs his credit." First Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen 631 P.2d919, 924 
(Utah 1981). A fact the importance of which is magnified by the pre-
recordation priority accorded a valid mechanic's lien. See Utah Code 
Ann. 38-1-5 (1988). State legislatures and courts attempt to balance 
these competing interest through their mechanic's lien statutes and 
judicial interpretations thereof." 
"[2] Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and a lien claimants may 
only acquire a lien by complying with the statutory provision 
authorizing them. Utah Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. Mecham 366P.2d 598, 600 
(1961). However, Utah Courts have recognized that substantial 
compliance with these provisions is all that is required. Chase v. 
Dawson, 215 P.2d 390 (1950); see also Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 
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P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). Moreover, we have stated that "[a] lien once 
acquired by labor performed on a building with the consent of the 
owner should not. . . be defeated by technicalities, when no rights of 
others are infringed, and no express command of the statute is 
disregarded". Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin 87P. 713, 716 (Utah 1906); 
see also Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1989. Courts 
from other states also subscribe to this view. See H.A.M.S. Co. v. 
Electrical Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 263 (Alaska 1977); 
Horseshoe Estates v. 2MCo., 713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986)." 
"Although courts have differing opinions about how liberally to 
construe provisions within their mechanic's lien statutes, "the modern 
trend is to dispense with arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable 
value in a particular fact situation Consolidated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. 
Jepson Elec. Contracting, Inc. 537P.2d80, 83 (Or. 1975). Utah has 
Followed this trend both in the legislature and in the courts..." 
"[3] With these general principles in mind, we turn to the particular 
arguments in this case. We must determine whether the rigorous 
interpretations urged by the Banks are necessary to protect the interests 
of the parties in the instant situation. Unless we find that Projects' 
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alleged failures have comprised a purpose of the mechanic's lien statute, 
those failures will be viewed as technical, and in the absence of any 
prejudice, we will uphold the lien." 
The issue to be properly determined by the court is whether 
Appellants failure to state time worked started and stopped somehow 
prejudiced Appellee in their case. If not, then lien should have been upheld 
by court. As Previously quoted above Washington Supreme Court ruled that 
in a suit to foreclose a mechanics lien, that the time work started and stopped 
could properly be introduced verbally in testimony in court. Appellee(s) do 
not ever claim to be prejudiced by the claim notice, in fact they preceded 
with a suit for damages based upon the mechanics lien statute. In the June 
17, 2002 hearing, they were prepared to offer testimony as to when the 
worked started and stopped. Although Utah Code does require that the 
information be a part of the lien notice for a mechanics lien, the purpose is 
provided within UCA 38-1-5 which states that "The liens herein provided 
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of commencement 
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when 
the building, improvement or structure was commenced...". Since 
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there were no other competing lien claims, the only one that could have been 
prejudiced was a mortgage company, that may have loaned on the property 
since the work began, but there are not claims from any mortgage company, 
therefore the lien should have been ruled a valid mechanics lien. 
On the outside chance that the court was correct in determining the 
lien to not be valid due to it being deficient per statute, there is no provision 
within statute to move a mechanics lien that may be invalid to summary 
proceedings per UCA 38-9. In fact UCA 38-9-2 (3) states that "this chapter 
does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who 
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics Liens." Appellant 
has already established that he was entitled to file a lien under 38-1-3. 
Appellee have acknowledge that the lien falls under Title 38, Chapter 1, 
Mechanics Liens by attempting to sue for damages under that section. UCA 
38-1-28 provides that any owner who disputes the validity or correctness 
of a mechanics lien may record a notice of release of lien and 
substitution of alternative security. Appellee come to court alleging that 
Appellant did not comply with the strictures of the Mechanics Lien statute, 
yet they are the ones that failed to comply. 
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It is clear that even if the lien filed by appellant is ruled invalid 
because of a deficiency, that it should not have been ruled a Wrongful Lien 
under UCA 38-9 as this is in conflict with the very provisions of the 
Wrongful Lien Section. In addition the Appellate courts have already 
decided the issue of what constitutes a Wrongful Lien. In Russell v. 
Thomas 999 P.2d 1245 (Utah App. 2000), The court concluded that if 
Defendants didn't have an interest in the property, that Wrongful Lien 
section applied. In This case all parties agreed that Appellant had an interest 
in the property, therefore Wrongful Lien section does not apply. Appellant 
also found Kurth v. Wiarda 991 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1999), in which 
there was disputes about the validity of a purported mechanics lien, and one 
party attempted to invoke Wrongful Lien section. Court dismissed the 
contractors suit for mechanics lien issues, but also denied Kirths wrongful 
lien claims. It is clear that even if a mechanics lien is somehow declared 
invalid, that it does not give the court the right to move that mechanics lien 
claim to summary proceedings based upon Wrongful I ien section. 
Appellee were awarded $3000 in damages based upon the provisions 
of UCA 38-9-5 which state that; 
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(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for 
$3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and 
for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or 
causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the 
real property, knowing or having reason to know that the 
document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim 
If a person files a wrongful lien and refuses to have it released within 
20 days then they are liable for $1000 in damages. Under this damages 
section of the wrongful lien chapter, if Appellant filed a wrongful lien he 
would only be liable to Appellee for $1000, unless they could establish that 
either Appellant knew that the lien was wrongful lien, or the lien was 
groundless or it contained a material misstatement or false claim. No 
evidence was ever presented that Appellant was responsible for any of those 
three issues that would entitle the court to charge him $3000. In Memo in 
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Support of Summary Judgment filed by Appellee(s) they used request for 
admissions Number 4, and Number 11, and stated that that Appellant had 
admitted them. Both of those statement were denied by Appellant and in 
fact Appellant filed an affidavit with his response to motion to Summary 
Judgment that again denied those assertions. Paragraph 7 of that affidavit 
stated that "The lien I filed was before the divorce action was filed, and 
was not done to "Punish the Packers for supporting their daughter" as 
was alleged."" Paragraphs 11-13 stated that Appellant had personally done 
work on the painting and had been told by Mrs. Packer that we would be 
paid for the work. Her exact words were "y°u kids could really use the 
money and I want to pay you for it." 
The final order stated that Appellant knew that the lien was wrongful. 
Appellant has argued all through out that proceedings that the lien was not 
even subject to Wrongful Lien Chapter. It is difficult to figure out how he 
was to have know that the lien was wrongful. In fact if he knew that the lien 
was missing the date and time work started prior to filing said lien, why 
wouldn't he have corrected it instead of risking going through all this legal 
crap. Both sides agreed that the work had been done and that Appellant had 
done "some work", therefore it is difficult to establish that the lien was 
groundless. There was disputed testimony as to the value of the lien and 
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Appellant testified that Appellee Sharon Packer stated in a conversation with 
him that it was worth $60,000 for the painting. The additional amount was 
for stenciling around fireplace and other work. Appellee testified through 
affidavit that the painting had ''sentimental value as it was painted by his 
daughter, but had no significant financial value." Reason and logic 
would demonstrate that a giant mural that was over 40 feet long and 10 feet 
high has some financial value. In any event the issue of the value of the 
painting is a disputed issue and should not subject Appellant to summary 
judgment for $3000. Again the Appellant believes that the trial court is in 
error in awarding $3000 in damages. 
On the issue of award of Attorneys fees, Appellant disagrees with the 
several of the trial Courts findings. At June 17, 2002 hearing, Appellee was 
awarded attorney fees and Appellant was told that he could file objection to 
those fees. Appellee through council filed affidavit of fees requesting $1200 
in legal fees. Court granted $750 and ruled that remainder was excessive. 
At the end of the case an affidavit of attorneys fees was re-submitted to the 
court asking for $3945 in Legal Fees plus filing fees in the amount of $160. 
The $3945 included the exact same legal fees that Appellee had tried to bill 
at the beginning of the case and court had already ruled to be excessive. 
Court granted Attorneys fees in the amount of $3750. One hundred and 
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ninety five dollars of that were already ruled excessive by the court. No 
additional evidence was presented to justify the additional award of 
attorneys fees. Appellate recognizes that trial court has broad discursion in 
awards of attorneys fees, but in this incidence where no additional evidence 
was provided to support such an award previously ruled excessive, 
Appellant believes trial court is in error. 
Appellant also believes Trial Court is in error when it awarded 
Appellee(s) an award for attorney fees that included all legal fees from the 
entire case. Much of the work done on the case by Appellee(s) council was 
for damages related to the mechanics lien and Appellant was the successful 
party on any damages related to mechanics lien claims. In Kurth v. 
Wirada, previously quoted above court made findings that included 
adjusting non-compensable claims intertwined with compensable claims. In 
this case, trial court just awarded Appellee(s) all fees expended in the case 
and made no adjustment for work that was done in regard to damages related 
to mechanics lien. In this Appellant argues that court was in error in the 
amount of fees awarded. If Appellants claim that Wrongful Lien is not 
appropriate disposition to this case, then no Attorney fees should have been 
awarded to Appellee(s). 
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Finally Appellant argues that court abused is discretion when it signed 
final order without there being any motion for summary judgment with 
which the court could grant such motion. On September 20, 2002, 
Appellee(s) motioned for summary judgment on all counts. At November 
27, 2002 hearing motion for summary judgment was denied by court. At 
that point if Appellee disagreed with the decision they could have submitted 
an order for courts signature and then moved court for reconsideration of 
that order. They could have also filed a new motion for summary judgment 
on just the wrongful lien issue. Appellee did neither but waited two months 
and then filed a motion for relief from order based upon Rule 4-501. Rule 4-
501 has been repealed, but may have been in effect at the time of said 
motion, but even if it was it says nothing about motions for relief from order, 
thus the motion was improper. Court issued a memo stating that there was 
not an order from which to seek relief from, but stated that the court would 
grant a motion for summary judgment for the minimum damages from the 
wrongful lien statute. At that point Appellee should have submitted a 
motion for summary judgment, and Appellant should have had a right to 
motion for oral arguments on the issue and other rights available to him. 
Appellant was denied those rights and Appellate Court can now look at this 
issue as an abuse of discretion on part of trial court. 
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Appellant also notes that on Feb 28, 2003 that Appellee mailed a copy 
of a proposed final order for review. Before it had arrived, Appellant served 
a counter claim and petition to grant permission to amend to add counter 
claim. The Petition was filed on March 3, 2003 with the court. Court didn't 
sign final order until March 19, 2003 but stated that the court had previously 
entered a final judgment and denied petition to grant permission to amend. 
The fact that the petition was filed almost twenty days before courts filing of 
final order, should have allowed Appellant to have his petition to amend 
heard before the court and as such there would have still been more issues 
for the court, and as such final order and judgment were not proper 
determination to the case. Appellate recognizes that court has right to grant 
permission to amend or to deny such, but in this case court abused its 
discretion by allowing several steps required by Rules of Civil Procedure to 
be circumvented. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the Trial courts decisions should be overturned for 
several reasons. Court should rule that wrongful lien was not proper 
disposition to this case. If court does grant Appellant request to rule 
wrongful lien section not appropriate disposition to case, then all other 
issues are moot and case should be remanded back to trial court for decisions 
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on remaining issues. If Appellate court does affirm the trial courts decision 
to declare lien wrongful, then there are still several remaining issues 
including amount of damages from wrongful lien statute, issue of attorneys 
fees, as well as procedural issues that prejudiced Appellant in his defense of 
case. For these reasons Appellant again argues that case should be 
remanded back to district court and remaining issues should be resolved 
including granting Appellant permission to amend claim to include counter 
claim, which has already been filed with the court. 
Respectfully Submitted this / / Day of November, 2003 
Earl Cline 
Appellant (Pro Se) 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was hand delivered this, _^^aay of November, 2003 to: 
Shawn Turner 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
466-6464 
31 
Exhibits 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien -- What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and 
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, 
performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment 
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property. 
38-1-5. Priority -- Over other encumbrances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, 
the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground 
for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to 
the time when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work 
begun, or first material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and 
which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement 
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground. 
38-1-7. Notice of claim -- Contents — Recording -- Service on owner of 
property. 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with 
the county recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the 
property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 days 
from the date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment 
or material on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 
38-11-102; or 
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(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as 
defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting 
forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of 
the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom the lien claimant was employed or to 
whom the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the 
first and last equipment or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; 
(e) the name, current address, and current phone number of the lien 
claimant; 
(f) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized 
agent; 
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 
3, Recording of Documents; and 
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in Section 
38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 
38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in 
accordance with Section 38-11-107. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), an acknowledgment or certificate is 
not required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 
1989. 
(4) (a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant 
shall deliver or mail by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: 
(i) the reputed owner of the real property; or 
(ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien 
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of 
the record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last 
completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or 
record owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and 
attorneys1 fees against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to 
enforce the lien. 
(5) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make 
rules governing the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(h). 
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38-1-28. Notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate security. 
(1) The owner of any interest in real property which is subject to a 
mechanics' lien recorded under this chapter, or any original contractor or 
subcontractor affected by the lien, who disputes the correctness or validity of 
the lien may, either before or after the commencement of an action to 
enforce the lien, record a notice of release of lien and substitution of 
alternate security, which meets the requirements of Subsection (2), in the 
office of the county recorder where the lien was recorded. 
(2) A notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate security 
recorded under Subsection (1) shall meet the requirements for the recording 
of documents in Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents, shall 
reference the lien sought to be released, and shall have as an attachment a 
surety bond or evidence of a cash deposit which: 
(a) (i) if a surety bond, is executed by a surety company which is treasury 
listed, A-rated by AM Best Company, and authorized to issue surety bonds 
in this state; or 
(ii) if evidence of a cash deposit, meets the requirements established by 
rule by the Department of Commerce in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act; 
(b) is in an amount equal to 150% of the amount claimed by the lien 
claimant in connection with the parcel of real property sought to be released; 
(c) is made payable to the lien claimant; 
(d) is conditioned for the payment of the judgment which would have 
been rendered against the property in the action to enforce the lien together 
with any costs and attorneys1 fees awarded by the court; and 
(e) has as principal the owner of the interest in the real property, or the 
original contractor or subcontractor affected by the lien. 
(3) Upon the recording of the notice of release of lien and substitution of 
alternate security under Subsection (1), the real property described in the 
notice shall be released from the mechanics1 lien to which the notice applies. 
(4) (a) Upon the recording of a notice of release of lien and substitution 
of alternate security under Subsection (1), the person recording the notice 
shall cause a copy of the notice, together with any attachments, to be served 
within 30 days upon the lien claimant. 
(b) If a suit is pending to foreclose the lien at the time the notice is served 
upon the lien claimant under Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall, 
within 90 days from the receipt of the notice, institute proceedings to add the 
alternate security as a party to the lien foreclosure suit. 
(5) The alternate security attached to a notice of release of lien shall be 
discharged and released upon: 
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(a) the failure of the lien claimant to commence a suit against the 
alternate security within the same time as an action to enforce the lien under 
Section 38-1-11; 
(b) the failure of the lien claimant to institute proceedings to add the 
alternate security as a party to a lien foreclosure suit within the time required 
by Subsection (4)(b); or 
(c) the dismissal with prejudice of the foreclosure suit or suit against the 
alternate security as to the lien claimant or the entry of judgment against the 
lien claimant in such a suit. 
(6) If a copy of the notice of release of lien and substitution of alternate 
security is not served upon the lien claimant as provided in Subsection 
(4)(a), the lien claimant shall have six months after the discovery of the 
notice to commence an action against the alternate security, except that no 
action may be commenced against the alternate security after two years from 
the date the notice was recorded. 
38-9-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, 
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title 
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property 
who offers a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in 
the state asserting a lien or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in 
certain real property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a 
present, lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, 
titleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and 
interest in that real property appears in the county recorder's records for the 
county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest 
in certain real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records 
for the county in which the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it 
is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
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(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner 
of the real property. 
38-9-2. Scope. 
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, 38-9-5, and 38-
9-6 apply to any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a 
lien pursuant to this chapter on or after May 5, 1997. 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens of 
record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a 
lis pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief 
permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 
38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 
38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien -- Damages. 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county 
recorder against real property is liable to a record interest holder for any 
actual damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or 
correct the wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request 
from a record interest holder of the real property delivered personally or 
mailed to the last-known address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to 
that record interest holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever 
is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or 
for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney 
fees and costs, who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a 
wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county 
recorder against the real property, knowing or having reason to know that 
the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
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SHAWN D. TURNER (5813) 
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 95921 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
(801) 446-6464 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDSON F. PACKER as Trustee for the ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
Edson F. Packer Trust and SHARON B. 
PACKER as Trustee for the Sharon B. 
Packer Trust 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
EARL CLINEII : Civil No. 020500239 
Defendant Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
November 27, 2002 a hearing was held on the Plaintiffs Motion. At the hearing the Court 
considered the pleadings filed with the Court, the testimony of the Defendant, and the argument of 
Plaintiffs counsel. Based on the evidence presented through the hearing and the prior hearing on 
the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant had filed an unlawful lien, the Court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
As this matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court accepts for purposes of the Motion only, the properly sworn and supported statements of 
the Defendant as true. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court finds the following material 
facts to be undisputed. 
• . . ! - • : 7 
1. Plaintiffs, Edson and Sharon Packer are Trustees of the respective Trusts which are the 
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action. 
2. The Defendant is an individual, who at all times relevant to these proceedings was the 
son-in-law of the individual Plaintiffs. 
3. The Defendant and the Plaintiffs daughter are currently involved in a divorce proceeding. 
4. On the 12th day of April, 2002, the Defendant filed a document entitled "mechanic's lien" 
with the Wasatch County Recorder, against property owned by the Plaintiffs in the 
amount of $70,000.00. 
5. The document purporting to be a mechanic's lien was invalid on its face as it failed to set 
forth the statutorily required elements and was untimely filed. 
6. The purported mechanic's lien was also invalid due to the Defendant's failure to comply 
with the notice requirements of the mechanic's lien statute, including notice to the 
Plaintiffs of the steps they could take to have the lien removed. 
7. Plaintiffs made demand on the Defendant pursuant to UCA §38-9-4 to release the lien. 
8. A period in excess of 20 days passed from the mailing of the letter and the Defendant 
failed to remove the lien. 
9. The Defendant alleges the lien was for the value of a mural painted on a wall in the home 
owned by the Plaintiffs. 
10. The Defendant has failed to produce a single receipt or other documentary item 
supporting his claim for the lien amount of $70,000.00. 
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11. The Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendant performed no work on the mural, but rather 
that the work was done by their daughter. The Defendant has alleged that he performed a 
nominal amount of labor on the mural 
12. The Defendant has failed to establish what work, if any, he performed on the mural or the 
value of that service by any legitimate means, he has failed to identify when the work was 
allegedly performed, or how he derived a value for his services. 
13. The Defendant alleges that he is entitled to a lien on the basis that the work was 
performed by his wife and that he supported his wife in her actions through such items as 
providing her transportation to her parent's home and his babysitting of their children 
while she worked on the mural. 
14. Under oath the Defendant stated that the purpose of the lien was not to recover the money 
from his in-laws but instead to "protect" the Defendant from a claim that his in-laws 
might have been making on his residence as part of the forth coming divorce between the 
Defendant and his wife. 
15. The Plaintiffs in their complaint sought recovery under the mechanic's lien statute, the 
wrongful lien statute, and under a general claim for punitive damages. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing facts the Court enters the following conclusions of law. 
1. Because the "mechanic's lien" filed by the Defendant was invalid on its face it was not a 
mechanic's lien pursuant to Utah law. 
2. The lien as filed constituted a wrongful lien as set forth in UCA §38-9-1 et. seq. 
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3. The Court finds that the Defendant knew the lien was a wrongful lien and further that the 
lien contained material misstatements and constituted a false claim pursuant to UCA §38-
9-4 (3) and accordingly the Plaintiffs are awarded damages in the amount of $3,000.00 
against the Defendant. 
4. The wrongful lien statute also provides for the recovery by the successful party of its 
costs and attorney's fees. The Court finds that the costs incurred by the Plaintiffs which 
are recoverable in this action are lUJ* and the attorney's fees to be awarded to the 
Plaintiffs a r e ^ ^ / ' ^ ( , including the $750.00 of attorney's fees previously awarded by 
the Court. 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff was obligated to elect its remedy between the two 
statutory schemes of the mechanic's lien statute or the wrongful lien statute. The Court 
further finds that by electing to have the hearing on the Plaintiffs Petition to Nullify Lien 
the Plaintiffs elected their remedy under that statutory scheme and are therefore barred 
from pursuing additional claims under the mechanic's lien statute. 
6. The Court further finds that based on the facial invalidity of the document purporting to 
be a mechanic's lien in this action that the document so filed did not constitute a 
mechanic's lien pursuant to statute and accordingly the wrongful lien statute was the only 
remedy available 
7. The Court finds that the penalty provisions contained within UCA §38-9-4 constitute a 
form of punitive damages thereby precluding the award of additional punitive damages in 
this matter. 
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Although the Defendant has made no motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that 
its determination that the Plaintiffs cannot recover under the mechanic's lien statute by 
virtue of the previous conclusions of law above, together with the Court's ruling on the 
damages involved in the wrongful lien statute result in the resolution of all issues present 
in this litigation. Accordingly this Order and Judgment constitutes the final Order and 
Judgment in the above-referenced litigation. 
JUDGMENT 
Based on the foregoing, Judgment is awarded against the Defendant Earl Cline II in the 
amount of ffityo/O * consisting of statutory damages of $3,000.00, recoverable costs int 
the amount of /(Jjx and attorneys fees in the amount of^>y / ^ 
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4th DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDSON F PACKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EARL CLINE II, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
Case No: 020500239 PR 
Judge: DONALD J. EYRE 
Date: November 27, 2 002 
Clerk: 
PRESENT 
roseb 
Plaintiff(s): EDSON F PACKER 
Defendant(s): EARL II CLINE 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): SHAWN D TURNER 
Audio 
Tape Count: 10:04 
HEARING 
Opening statements by Mr. Turner regarding the motion for summary 
j udgment. 
Response by Mr. Cline. 
Response by Mr. Turner. 
Defendant addressed the issues presented by Mr. Turner. 
It is the findings of the Court that the motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
Page 1 (last) 
Earl Cline (In Pro Per) 
1565E7200 S 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
568-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY 
EDSON F. PACKER as Trustee for the AFFIDAVIT OF EARL CLINE 
Edson F. Packer trust and SHARON B. 
PACKER as Trustee for the Sharon B. 
Packer Trust 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
Civil #020500239 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Earl L. Cline II 
Defendant (filed in pro per) 
Earl L. Cline, having been duly sworn does hereby depose and say: 
1. I am above 21 years of age and a defendant in the above named action. 
2. The Plaintiff(s) are my father and mother in law through my marriage to their 
daughter. 
3. My wife and I are currently involved in a divorce action which was filed by my wife 
on April 11,2002. 
4. Plaintiff(s) and myself are involved in numerous disputes related to the division of 
marital assets as well alleged loans that Plaintiff(s) have purported to have made to 
me as well as work done on their personal home by myself and my wife. 
5. On March 24, 2002 My brother and I were retrieving some business items from my 
home and my wife Julie started to give me a hard time about all the supposed "debt" 
that we had. I made the comment that aside from a couple of credit cards and a 
couple of disputed medical debts, that we didn't really owe that much money. Julie 
responded that she had just signed some sort of loan document with her father and 
their attorney that stated all the money as well as down payment they had given us 
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for the house and the van they gave us several years ago were loans and that he was 
going to have me pay back half of them in the future divorce action. She told me that 
he had kept track of things and they had-gjri*MS over $100,000 since the beginning 
of our marriage. ^ c ! ^ / &/ 
6. Shortly thereafter but before the filing of the divorce I calculated the time since we 
had last performed labor on their home to determine if I still had Um rights for the 
work my wife and I had done on the home and it turned our that they had not yet 
expired. 
7. The lien I filed was before the divorce action was filed, and was not done to "punish 
the Packers for supporting their daughter" as was alleged. 
8. Subsequent to the original lien filing one of the Plaintiff(s) neighbors called and said 
that the legal description I used to file the lien was including property that Plaintiff(s) 
had sold to other parties and asked if I would remove it from their property. I went 
up the next day to change the legal description, but the lady at the recorders office 
asked if I could release the lien and file a new one with the proper legal description. I 
did as she requested. 
9. On or about September 24, 2002 I received an envelope from Shawn Turner 
(plaintiff(s) Council) certified mail which contained several documents including a 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment. Attached to the 
Memorandum was a copy of Plaintiff s First Set Of Interrogatories And Request For 
Admissions. The last page of the Interrogatories was a signature page signed by 
Shawn Turner himself and dated August 15, 2002. There was not a Mailing 
Certificate attached to the document. 
10. This is the first time that I have seen this request for Interrogatorties. If they had 
been mailed to me in the past I never received them. 
11. I have personally done work and provided materials on the painting in the Plaintiff(s) 
home. 
12. My wife has also done work on the Plaintiff(s) home and had used marital assets to 
procure supplies and materials to do the work. 
13. I had been told on several occasions by both my wife and also Mrs. Packer that we 
would be paid for the work in the mural and other work in the home when it was 
finished. 
FURTHER RESPONDENT SAYETH NOT 
Dated the day of October, 2002 
/ ><£* J^ 
Earl Cline (In Pro Per) 
1565 E 7200 S 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
568-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY 
EDSON F. PACKER as Trustee for the RESPONSE TO 
Edson F. Packer trust and SHARON B. PLAINTIFFS FIRST REQUEST 
PACKER as Trustee for the Sharon B. FOR INTERROGATORIES 
Packer Trust 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
Civil #020500239 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Earl L. Cline II 
Defendant (filed in pro per) 
Defendant here by submits'the attached answers to the Plaintiff(s) request for 
Interrogatories. 
Answers to "Request For Admissions" 
1. Admit there is'ao written contract between you and any of the Plaintiffs with 
respect to the mural painted in Plaintiff s home. 
1. Admit. 
2. Admit there was no verbal contract between yourself and any of the Plaintiffs 
respecting the mural in Plaintiff s home. 
2. Deny. Before Julie left for Salt Lake in July of 1999,1 had told her that we 
couldn't afford for her to go back to Salt Lake. Julie got on the phone and her 
mother told her that She would pay Julie to paint a Mural so she could afford 
to come home. 
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In October 1999 Julie asked me if she could go home and finish the Mural. I 
spoke with Sharon on the phone and she told me that "as soon as Julie finishes 
the Mural we can pay you kids for it and I know that you could really use the 
money". £ f U o j J L U ^ ^ * i J> U <? : lo *> ^ * ^ 
In Sept. 2001,1 told Edson that I could come up to Bear Lake and help them 
clean out the cabin. Sharon said "I think it would be better if you (Earl) 
stayed over the weekend and watched the children because then Julie can 
spend the weekend painting the fireplace and working on the stenciling." She 
then said "We can pay you for the work after you are done and you kids could 
really use the money right now". 
3. Admit you did not provide $705300.00 worth of materials and/or labor on the 
mural located in Plaintiff s home. 
3. Deny. The $70,300 was for the full value of the painting after it was completed. 
4. Admit you knew that you had not provided $70,300.00 worth of labor and/or 
materials on the mural in Plaintiffs home at the time that you filed the mechanic's lien 
that is the subject matter of this action. 
4. Deny. The value of the painting was derived from statements made by Sharon 
Packer and Julie Cline in Sept. 2001. 
5. Admit the document attached hereto as exhibit" A ", is a true and correct copy of 
the document you created and filed with the Wasatch County Recorder. 
5. Admit. This is the second lien. The first lien was released because I had the 
wrong legal description and the county recorders office asked me to file a new 
lien with the right description. 
6. Admit that you filed the original of the document designated as exhibit" A " with 
the Wasatch County Recorder's Office. 
6. Admit. 
7. Admit you received the original of the letter attached hereto as exhibit "8" 
7. Admit. 
8. Admit that after receiving this letter you did fail to cause the lien to be released 
within the time frame demanded by the letter. 
8. Admit. 
2 
9. Admit that you are currently a party in a divorce action with Julie Cline, the 
daughter of Plaintiffs, Edson and Sharon Packer. 
9. Admit. 
10. Admit that you filed the mechanic's lien against the Packer's property after the 
divorce proceedings had been initiated. 
10. Deny. The original lien was filed on or about March 22,2002. The 
divorce was not filed until April 11, 2002. 
11. Admit you filed the mechanic's lien in an attempt to harass and punish the 
Packer's and/or to coerce them into pressuring Julie Cline into making concessions in the 
divorce proceeding. 
11. Deny. It was filed because Julie told me that her father had made her sign 
papers that stated that every bit of money that they had given to us throughout 
our marriage was all loans and that they were going to ask the Judge to have 
me re-pay them through the impending divorce action. 
Responses to "Interrogatories" 
1. Identify each individual providing answers to these interrogatories or whom you 
consulted in order to answer these interrogatories. 
1. Just Myself. 
2. Identify any labor you claim to have provided on the mural located in the Packer's 
home by providing the following information: 
a. The dates on which you provided any labor. 
b. The specific tasks that you took constituting that labor. 
C. The amount of time you spent employed on those tasks on each individual date. 
2. a. Summer 1999, trips to Wall Mart to buy paint and supplies. Watching the 
children for the weekend so she could stay and paint. Julie spent much of the 
summer working on the painting. During Christmas 1999 through Feb. 2000 I 
spent several nights and or days helping her with various parts of the painting. 
During Summer 2000,1 spent several days with Julie purchasing supplies and 
preparing for the trip to Houston where she was going to learn to paint the 
3 
738 Utah 798 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ment. The Atkinsons refused both of 
these proposals, opting instead to obtain an 
immediate settlement. 
Furthermore, the trial court questioned 
the Atkinsons extensively regarding their 
comprehension of Chad's condition and the 
implications of the settlement: 
THE COURT: Do you understand that 
by settling this case, and regardless of 
what later transpires, when you find out 
later that the child's injury is worse than 
you anticipated, and on the other hand 
even if it's better, that you will not ever 
be able to come back against Intermoun-
tain Health Care? Do you understand 
that? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, sir, I do. 
For the aforementioned reasons, we con-
clude that the probate hearing was con-
ducted in a jurisprudential manner and that 
the Atkinsons participated with full knowl-
edge of Chad's rights and the implications 
of their actions upon any future causes of 
action against IHC or Wetzel 
Furthermore, the release signed by the 
Atkinsons was done with full knowledge of 
Chad's rights, which has the effect of bar-
ring this cause of action. The release 
signed by the Atkinsons acquits IHC and 
their agent, Wetzel, 
from any and all claims, actions, causes 
of action, demands, rights, damages, 
costs, loss of service, expenses and com-
pensation whatsoever . . . on account of 
or in any way growing out of any and all 
known and unknown, foreseen and un-
foreseen bodily and personal injuries . . . 
resulting or to result from the acci-
dent 
We affirm the trial court's determination 
that, as a matter of law, no genuine issue 
of material fact exists with regard to the 
Atkinsons' allegations of fraud and negli-
gent misrepresentation.17 We have duly 
considered the Atkinsons' other claims and 
find them to be without merit. 
Affirmed. 
17. The rule on summary judgment may apply 
even when some fact remains in dispute, we 
affirm summary judgment when all material 
HOWE, Associate, C.J., and 
STEWART, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, J J. concur. 
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PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
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COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO., 
Valley Bank & Trust Co., Cottonwood 
Thrift & Loan Co., Western Savings & 
Loan Co., Bradshaw Development Co., 
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Sept. 6, 1990. 
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Contractor brought action to foreclose 
mechanic's lien, and sought determination 
of priorities among claimants. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Judith M. 
Billings, J., granted summary judgment for 
financial institutions holding deeds of trust. 
Contractor appealed, and financial institu-
tions cross-appealed, seeking award of at-
torney fees. The Supreme Court, Gregory 
K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge, held 
that: (1) mechanic's lien notice was not 
invalid, even though notary failed to in-
clude her addres|> and commission expira-
tion date in jurat, contractor failed to seg-
regate contract amounts attributable to in-
dividual condominium units, property de-
scription was overly broad, notice described 
property not initially owned by landowner, 
and contractor included claims arising un-
der two separate contracts; (2) mechanic's 
lien notice was not invalid under Condomin-
ium Owners Act merely because lien de-
scribed entire property on which condomm-
facts are not genuinely controverted. See Heglar 
Ranch, 619 P.2d at 1391. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED v, 
Cite as 798 P.2d 
ium complex was constructed and failed to 
allocate separate amounts to be different 
units; (3) one financial institution was 
properly added as party defendant after 
expiration of period for commencing me-
chanic's lien action; and (4) trial court prop-
erly declined to consider evidence of par-
ties' intent when construing recorded me-
chanic's lien release. 
Affirmed in part; reversed and re-
manded in part. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>863, 934(1) 
In determining whether trial court 
properly granted summary judgment, Su-
preme Court must review facts in light 
most favorable to losing party, review trial 
court's legal conclusions for correctness, 
and give no particular deference to trial 
court's view of the law. 
2. Mechanics' Liens <®=>116 
Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, 
and lien claimants may only acquire lien by 
complying with statutory provisions autho-
rizing them. 
3. Mechanics' Liens <§=>126 
Failure to comply with statutory re-
quirements for notice of mechanic's lien 
will be viewed as technical, and lien will be 
upheld in absence of any prejudice, unless 
failures have compromised a purpose of 
mechanic's lien statute. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-
7, 38-1-8. 
4. Mechanics' Liens e=>154(6) 
Strict compliance with notary public 
statute is not required to satisfy notice 
verification requirement of mechanic's lien 
statute. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 46-1-8. 
5. Mechanics' Liens <s=>154(6) 
Jurat on mechanic's lien notice, which 
contained notary's signature, the date, and 
her official seal, substantially complied 
with verification requirement of mechanics 
n
^n statute and with notary statute, and 
thus fact that notary failed to include her 
address and commission expiration date did 
n
°t invalidate notice. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 
46-1-8. 
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6. Mechanics' Liens <^>154(6) 
Even if jurat on mechanic's lien notice 
must conform with notary statute, substan-
tial compliance would be sufficient. U.C.A. 
1953, 38-1-7, 46-1-8. 
7. Mechanics' Liens ®=>136(2) 
In determining adequacy of property 
description in mechanic's lien notice, court's 
main purpose is to determine whether no-
tice adequately informed other claimants of 
existence of lien and whether other claim-
ants were prejudiced, as matter of law, by 
the descriptive terms. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7. 
8. Mechanics' Liens e=>136(2) 
For competing claimants to prevail on 
allegation that property description in me-
chanic's lien notice was inadequate, claim-
ants would have to show that they were 
somehow misled or prejudiced, and it would 
not be enough for them to show that other 
persons might have been prejudiced by lien 
notice. U.C.A 1953, 38-1-7. 
9. Mechanics' Liens <&=>149(4) 
Mechanic's lien notice was not invalid, 
at least against competing claimants, sim-
ply because lienor failed to segregate con-
tract amounts attributable to individual 
condominium units, where one party was 
apparently the only owner of affected prop-
erty when lien attached, and competing 
claimants did not argue that notice misled 
them as to claimed lien, nor did they dem-
onstrate any prejudice from aggregation of 
claims. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 38-1-8. 
10. Mechanics' Liens <§=>157(3) 
Mechanic's lien would not be invalidat-
ed merely because it overdescribed proper-
ty upon which lien could properly attach, 
where there was no evidence that descrip-
tion was fraudulent, and competing claim-
ants did not argue that they were misled or 
prejudiced by description. U.C.A.1953, 38-
1-7. 
11. Libel and Slander <s=>130 
Inclusion of additional property in me-
chanic's lien notices would subject lienor to 
appropriate relief in slander of title action. 
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12. Mechanics' Liens <§=>157(3) 
Mechanic's lien would not be invalidat-
ed as to competing claimants even if notice 
described property which was not even 
owed by owner at time that work was 
commenced on project, where court could 
determine what part of property was actu-
ally subject to lien, and competing claim-
ants did not complain that they were actu-
ally misled or prejudiced by notice. U.C.A. 
1953, 38-1-7. 
13. Mechanics' Liens <^149(1) 
Mechanic's lien notice may aggregate 
claims arising under more than one con-
tract. 
14. Mechanics' Liens <£=>157(1) 
Lienor's inclusion of claims arising un-
der two separate contracts in single me-
chanic's lien notice did not invalidate lien; 
competing claimants did not argue that no-
tice failed to adequately notify them of 
existence of lien or in any way prejudiced 
them. 
15. Mechanics' Liens <&=>149(4) 
Mechanic's lien notice was not invalid 
under Condominium Ownership Act, which 
provides that no lien shall arise or be effec-
tive against property subsequent to record-
ing of declaration, even though contractor 
filed mechanic's lien describing entire prop-
erty on which condominium complex was 
constructed subsequent to filing of condo-
minium declarations and failed to allocate 
specific amounts to different units; only 
effect under statute of intermediate filing 
of declarations was to make lien propor-
tionately effective against each unit con-
structed under contract and each unit's cor-
responding undivided interest in common 
area. U.C.A.1953, 57-8-19. 
16. Mechanics' Liens <^260(6), 268 
Statute requiring mechanic's lien 
claimant to commence lien action and 
record lis pendens within 12 months after 
completion of original contract or suspen-
sion of work thereunder is not statute of 
limitations; penalty for not commencing 
action to enforce lien within 12-month peri-
od is invalidation of lien rather than preclu-
sion of claim as with traditional statute of 
limitation. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-11. 
17. Mechanics' Liens <s^ 268 
Mechanic's lienor's timely recordation 
of lis pendens imparts constructive notice 
to all persons concerned with property of 
action to enforce lien, regardless of wheth-
er they were named as parties or had actu-
al knowledge of action. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-
11, 78-40-2. 
18. Mechanics' Liens <s=*263(10) 
Commencement of mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action within 12 months after 
completion of original contract or suspen-
sion of work thereunder preserves lien as 
to all interested parties even if not named 
as party to that action. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-
11. 
19. Mechanics' Liens <®=>268 
Only when mechanic's lienor fails to 
timely record lis pendens can interested 
person argue that it is not subject to me-
chanic's lien, and then only if such person 
was not named as party to foreclosure ac-
tion and did not have actual knowledge of 
action. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-11. 
20. Mechanics' Liens <s^264(l) 
Financial institution holding deeds of 
trust was subject to mechanic's lien, where 
contractor commenced foreclosure action 
and filed lis pendens within required 12-
month period after completion of contract 
or suspension of work thereunder, and thus 
financial institution could properly be 
joined by appropriate amendment to com-
plaint even after expiration of 12-month 
period. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-11. 
21. Evidence <s=*397(l) 
If contract is clear on its face, trial 
court need not, and in fact should not, 
consider evidence" of contrary meaning. 
22. Mechanics' Liens <®=>236 
Trial court properly declined to consid-
er evidence of parties' intent when constru-
ing recorded mechanic's lien release, where 
language of release was susceptible of no 
other interpretation but that two condomin-
iums were completely released from scope 
of lien. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED v. 
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23. Mechanics' Liens <s=>236 
Use of word "partial" with respect to 
partial release of mechanic's lien did not 
create ambiguity which would allow trial 
court to consider evidence of parties' intent 
when construing release, where release 
clearly was "partial" because it only re-
leased two of eight condominium units oth-
erwise coveWd by lien notice. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
24. Appeal and Error ^177 
Supreme Court would not consider 
whether attorney fees should be awarded 
to claimant which prevailed in mechanic's 
lien foreclosure action brought by compet-
ing claimant, where claimant had not re-
quested attorney fees as part of its motion 
for summary judgment, which trial court 
had granted. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-18. 
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GREGORY K. ORME, Court of 
Appeals Judge: 
Projects Unlimited, Inc., appeals from a 
summary judgment invalidating its me-
chanic's lien against the interests of Copper 
State Thrift & Loan Company, Valley Bank 
& Trust Company, and Cottonwood Thrift 
& Loan Company, Inc. We affirm the sum-
mary judgment as to Cottonwood Thrift, 
but reverse as to Copper State and Valley 
Bank. 
I. FACTS 
Bradshaw Development Company, Inc. 
("Bradshaw"), owned a parcel of land, the 
Highland Orchards property, which it 
planned to develop into the Highland Or-
chards Condominium project. The proper-
ty was divided into two parcels with the 
objective of constructing condominiums in 
two phases—phase I and phase II. Phase 
I, when completed, would consist of eigh-
teen condominium units. Bradshaw en-
gaged Projects Unlimited, Inc. ("Projects") 
to construct some of the phase I units. In 
September 1982, Bradshaw and Projects 
entered into a contract for the construction 
of two units—FF-6-A1 and FF-6-B1, here-
inafter referred to as units 1 and 2. Those 
parties entered into a second contract in 
April 1983 concerning the contruction of 
six additional units—FF-5-A1, FF-5-B1, 
FF-U-A1, FF-11-A2, FF-11-B1, and FF-
11-B2, hereinafter referred to as units 3 
through 8, respectively. The contracts al-
located prices on a per-unit basis. 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Company 
financed construction of the eight units. 
The Copper State loan to Bradshaw was 
secured by two trust deeds. The first deed 
was recorded in December 1982 and cover-
ed units 1 and 2. The second deed was 
recorded in June 1983 and covered units 3 
through 8. 
Relying on the terms of its loan agree-
ment with Bradshaw, Copper State refused 
to advance additional funds to Bradshaw in 
June 1983. Sometime thereafter, Brad-
shaw stopped making payments to 
Projects. On October 7, 1983, Projects 
ceased construction with a substantial bal-
ance still owing to Projects. Bradshaw did 
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not record its condominium declaration un-
til August 1983. 
During construction, units 1, 2, and 3 
were sold. The sales of units 1 and 2 were 
financed by Valley Bank & Trust Company, 
which recorded trust deeds on those units 
in May 1983. Copper State subordinated 
its December 1982 trust deed to the May 
1983 trust deeds of Valley Bank. The sale 
of unit 3 was financed by Western Savings 
& Loan Company, which is not a party to 
this appeal. After construction was halted, 
units 4 and 5 were sold. The sales of these 
units were financed by Cottonwood Thrift 
& Loan Company and secured by trust 
deeds recorded in December 1983. 
In November 1983, Projects recorded a 
notice of mechanic's lien against the High-
land Orchards property. The notice de-
scribed Bradshaw as the owner of the sub-
ject property. The lien notice described the 
property by a metes and bounds description 
including all of the phase I and phase II 
property.1 The notice did not describe the 
eight constructed units, by employing their 
descriptions as used in the condominium 
declaration or otherwise, nor did it allocate 
unpaid amounts attributable to each unit. 
The notice did not distinguish between 
work performed under the September 1982 
and April 1983 contracts. The notice of 
lien cited the construction starting date as 
October 10, 1982, and the ending date as 
October 7, 1983. Although the notice of 
lien contained the signature and seal of a 
notary and the date of notarization, it did 
not give the notary's address or commis-
sion expiration date. 
Bradshaw and Projects negotiated to re-
lease from the lien units 4 and 5, financed 
by Cottonwood Thrift. The lien release 
specifically stated that units 4 and 5 were 
released from the scope of the lien in ex-
change for the payment of $90,000. There-
after, Projects filed an amended notice of 
lien. The amended notice was essentially 
identical to the initial notice except that 
$85,000 was added to the "credits and off-
1. Accordingly, the metes and bounds descrip-
tion was not confined to the property on which 
the eight units constructed by Projects were 
located. However, it appears from the record 
sets" figure and subtracted from the "bal-
ance owing" figure. The same metes and 
bounds description was used to describe 
the property. The amended notice did not 
exempt units 4 and 5 from the property 
description, but attached to it were a map 
of the entire condominium project and a 
copy of the partial release. 
Projects commenced an action to fore-
close the lien and recorded a lis pendens in 
March 1984. The complaint alleged that 
Bradshaw had breached its contracts with 
Projects. The complaint also called for a 
determination of priorities among the vari-
ous claimants. Valley Bank was not 
named as a defendant in the complaint but 
had actual knowledge of the action at least 
by August 1984, when it reviewed a title 
report showing Projects' lis pendens and 
initiated relevant correspondence with 
Projects. On May 24, 1985, almost twenty 
months after it ceased construction, 
Projects filed an amended complaint which 
joined Valley Bank and others as defen-
dants. Bradshaw failed to answer either 
complaint, and a default judgment was en-
tered against it in December 1985. 
Copper State, Cottonwood Thrift, Valley 
Bank, and Western Savings ("the Banks") 
moved for summary judgment on the re-
maining claims. They collectively argued 
that Projects' lien was invalid under the 
mechanic's lien statute and under the Con-
dominium Ownership Act. Essentially, 
their arguments under the mechanic's lien 
statute were that (1) the jurat lacked the 
notary's address and the date her commis-
sion expired, (2) the notice describes more 
property than was actually subject to the 
lien, (3) the notice describes property which 
Bradshaw initially did not own, and (4) the 
lien did not distinguish between work per-
formed under the September 1982 and 
April 1983 contracts. The Banks also ar-
gued that the Condominium Ownership Act 
required Projects to file a separate lien on 
each condominium unit as described in the 
condominium declaration. 
that the only new structures on any part of the 
Highland Orchards property were the units con-
structed by Projects. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED v. 
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Valley Bank also argued that Projects 
had failed to„join it as a defendant within 
the statutorily prescribed time and was 
therefore barred from later amending its 
complaint to add that bank as a defendant. 
Moreover, Cottonwood Thrift argued that 
it was not a proper party to the suit be-
cause Projects had released the units it 
financed from the scope of the lien. 
Projects filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment on its claim against 
Copper State, its construction lender. 
The trial court granted the Banks' sum-
mary judgment motions and denied 
Projects' motion. The court concluded that 
(1) Projects had unequivocally released 
from the lien's coverage the units financed 
by Cottonwood Thrift, (2) Projects failed to 
join Valley Bank as a party within the 
required time, and (3) the lien was invalid 
due to improper notarization "and on 
grounds otherwise set forth in the moving 
defendants' memoranda on file." 
On appeal, Projects challenges each of 
the trial court's conclusions. Primarily, it 
argues that Utah does not require a lien 
notarization to contain the notary's address 
and/or commission expiration date. 
The Banks assert the same arguments on 
appeal that they asserted in the trial court. 
In particular, they argue that we should 
affirm the trial court's decision on the nota-
rization issue. Moreover, the Banks assert 
that, even assuming we were to agree with 
Projects on the notarization issue, we can 
and should affirm the summary judgment 
due to other failures in the lien notice. 
And indeed, "we may affirm trial court 
decisions on any proper ground(s), despite 
the trial court's having assigned another 
reason for its ruling." Buehner Block Co. 
* UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 
1988); see also State v. One 1979 Pontiac 
Trans Am, 111 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah Ct.App. 
W89). The Banks also cross-appeal, seek-
lng an award of attorney fees in the dis-
trict court and on appeal. 
2
- The Banks do not argue that Projects com-
pletely failed to comply with any of the particu-
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] "Summary judgment is proper only 
when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Trans-
america Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power 
& Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990); 
see Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). In our determina-
tion of whether the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment, we must re-
view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the losing party. E.g., Ron Case Roof-
ing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). More-
over, we review the trial court's legal con-
clusions for correctness and give no partic-
ular deference to that court's view of the 
law. Id. 
III. MECHANIC'S LIENS 
GENERALLY 
We begin our analysis by recognizing 
that "[t]he purpose of the mechanic's lien 
act is remedial in nature and seeks to pro-
vide protection to laborers and materialmen 
who have added directly to the value of the 
property of another by their materials or 
labor." Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). On the other 
hand, we recognize that liens create "an 
encumbrance on property that deprives the 
owner of his ability to convey clear title 
and impairs his credit/' First Sec. Mtg. Co. 
v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981), a 
fact the importance of which is magnified 
by the pre-recordation priority accorded a 
valid mechanic's lien. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-5 (1988). State legislatures and 
courts attempt to balance these competing 
interests through their mechanic's lien stat-
utes and judicial interpretations thereof. 
[2] Mechanic's liens are purely statu-
tory, and lien claimants may only acquire a 
lien by complying with the statutory provi-
sions authorizing them. Utah Sav. & 
Loan Assoc, v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 
338, 366 P.2d 598, 600 (1961). However, 
Utah courts have recognized that substan-
tial compliance with these provisions is all 
that is required.2 Chase v. Dawson, 117 
lar requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 
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Utah 295, 296, 215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950); see 
also Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 
P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). Moreover, we 
have stated that "[a] lien once acquired by 
labor performed on a building with the 
consent of the owner should not . . . be 
defeated by technicalities, when no rights 
of others are infringed, and no express 
command of the statute is disregarded." 
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 
249, 87 P. 713, 716 (1906) (quoting 20 Am. 
& Eng. Encyclopedia of Law 276); see also 
Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 
563 (Utah 1989). Courts from other states 
also subscribe to this view. See, e.g., H.A. 
M.S Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alas-
ka, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 263 (Alaska 1977); 
Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d 776, 
781 (Wyo.1986). 
Although courts have differing opinions 
about how liberally to construe provisions 
within their mechanic's lien statutes, "the 
modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary 
rules which have no demonstrable value in 
a particular fact situation."3 Consolidat-
ed Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson Elec. 
Contracting, Inc., 272 Or. 376, 380, 537 
(1983) Rather, they argue that Projects' efforts 
did not substantially comply with the statutes. 
3. This trend is not confined to this area of the 
law but can be seen in others as well. See, eg, 
Tech-Fluid Servs, Inc v. Gavilan Operating, 
Inc, 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah CtAppl990) In 
Tech-Fluid, the Utah Court of Appeals took a 
similar position in the area of redemption The 
court concluded that where the provisions in 
the redemption statute are "procedural in na-
ture and do not affect any substantive rights of 
the purchaser [substantial] compliance is all 
that is necessary" Id at 1334 
4. The current version of section 38-1-7 provides 
in pertinent part 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement set 
ting forth the following information 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if 
known or, if not known, the name of the 
record owner, 
(b) the name of the person by whom he 
was employed or to whom he furnished the 
equipment or material, 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or 
service was performed or the first and last 
equipment or material was furnished, 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient 
for identification, and 
(e) the signature of the hen claimant or his 
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate 
>P.2d 80, 83 (1975). Utah has followed this 
Arend both in the legislature and in the 
[courts. A legislative example of this trend 
]s the 1985 amendment to section 38-1-7 of 
pie mechanic's lien statute. The 1985 
^amendment greatly simplified the mechan-
ic's lien notice, dispensing with several of 
me more cumbersome lien notice require-
ments.4 One judicial example of this trend 
is Mickelsen, in which this court clarified 
the lien verification process and dispensed 
with the notion that the claimant's verifica-
tion required any formal ritual. 767 P.2d 
at 563. 
[3] With these general principles in 
mind, we turn to the particular arguments 
in this case. We must determine whether 
the rigorous interpretations urged by the 
Banks are necessary to protect the inter-
ests of the parties in the instant situation. 
Unless we find that Projects' alleged fail-
ures have compromised a purpose of the 
mechanic's lien statute, those failures will 
be viewed as technical, and in the absence 
of any prejudice, we will uphold the lien.5 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp 1990). Re-
quirements under the 1984 version of this provi-
sion which are no longer part of the statute 
include actual verification of the statements in 
the lien notice, "a statement of [the claimant's] 
demand after deducting all just credits and off-
sets [, and] a statement of the terms, time 
given and conditions of his contract " Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983) 
5. It is important to emphasize the scope of this 
opinion. Our focus is of course upon the partic-
ular parties and particular facts in this case, but 
it is further narrowed by the "as a matter of 
law" standard implicit in reviewing summary 
judgments It may well be that the same lien 
notices would have worked significant prejudice 
on other parties not before us, such as owners 
of, or lenders secured by, the phase II parcel to 
which Projects had no valid claim Thus it is 
entirely possible that we would invalidate this 
same notice as it applied to another party who 
could demonstrate prejudice Cf Horseshoe Es-
tates v 2M Co., 713 P2d 776, 781 (Wyo.1986) 
(holding hen sufficient as against party who 
failed to demonstrate prejudice o& that it was 
misled) It is even conceivable thst the Banks, 
or some of them, could demonstrate actual prej-
udice in the context of a trial. At this juncture, 
however, we only consider the Banks' conten 
tion that the hens are so flawed as to simply be 
void, regardless of any actual prejudice. 
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IV. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UN-
DER SECTIONS 38-1-7 AND -8 
Sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of Utah's 
mechanic's lien ^ statute identify the statu-
tory elements op a lien notice. At the time 
the dispute arose, section 38-1-7 provided 
that every notice of lien recorded with the 
county recorder must contain 
a notice of intention to hold and claim a 
lien, and a statement of his demand after 
deducting all just credits and offsets, 
with the name of the reputed owner if 
known or if not known, the name of the 
record owner, and also the name of the 
person by whom he was employed or to 
whom he furnished the material, with a 
statement of the terms, time given and 
conditions of his contract, specifying the 
time when the first and last labor was 
performed, or the first and last material 
was furnished, and also a description of 
the property to be charged with the lien, 
sufficient for identification, which claim 
must be verified by the oath of himself 
or of some other person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp.1983).6 
Section 38-1-8 provided: 
Liens against two or more buildings or 
other improvements owned by the same 
person may be included in one claim; but 
in such case the person filing the claim 
must designate the amount claimed to be 
due to him on each of such buildings or 
other improvements. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1988). 
A. Failure of the Jurat 
At the time the dispute arose, Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp.1983) provided that 
every notice of lien "must be verified by 
the oath of [the lien claimant] or of some 
other person." The district court found 
that a proper verification under section 38-
1~7 required compliance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 46-1-8 (1953), which provided: "To 
all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations 
and instruments of every kind taken and 
certified by a notary public he shall affix to 
6
- Section 38-1-7 has been amended since 1983. 
See supra note 4. 
'• In First Security Mortgage, a lien notice was 
held invalid because the lien claimant failed to 
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his signature his official title and his place 
of residence and the date on which his 
commission expires." The court then con-
cluded that the notary's failure to include 
her address and commission expiration date 
in the jurat invalidated the verification, 
which made the lien void. We disagree. 
Initially, we note that verification is an 
essential part of a lien notice and "not a 
hypertechnicality that we can discount." 
First Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 
919, 922 (Utah 1981).7 Verification by the 
lien claimant was thought necessary so 
that "[fjrivolous, unfounded, and inflated 
claims can thereby be minimized, and the 
prejudgment property rights of the [prop-
erty owners] receive their due protection." 
Id. Verification accomplishes this purpose 
by creating "the possibility of perjury pros-
ecution for verifying a false lien claim." 
H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of 
Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 264 (Alaska 
1977) (lien must be signed by claimant; 
corporate acknowledgment insufficient). 
Although the 1983 mechanic's lien stat-
ute requires verification, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-7 (Supp.1983), it does not state any 
particular procedure for verification. 
Those procedures have developed judicially 
in cases like First Security Mortgage. 
One of the most recent and instructive 
cases defining these procedures is Michel-
sen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 
1989), decided after the trial court made its 
ruling in this case. In Mickelsen, we listed 
the essential elements for a proper verifica-
tion: "(1) [Tjhere must be a correct written 
oath or affirmation, and (2) it must be 
signed by the affiant in the presence of a 
notary or other person authorized to take 
oaths, and (3) the latter must affix a proper 
jurat." Id. at 564. The Banks do not 
contest that an oath was made or that it 
was signed before a notary. They simply 
argue that the notary failed to affix a 
"proper jurat" because she omitted her ad-
sign the oath. The notice was insufficient even 
though the notary had signed the certificate. 
See also Worthington & Kimball Constr. Co. v. C 
& A Dev. Co., Ill P.2d 475 (Utah 1989). 
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dress and the expiration date of her com-
mission. 
[4-6] The Banks would have us adopt a 
position requiring strict compliance with 
the notary public statute in order to satis-
fy the verification requirement of the me-
chanic's lien statute as expounded in Mick-
elsen. We decline to adopt this position. 
A jurat is "merely evidence of the fact that 
the oath was properly taken before the 
duly authorized officer." 50 C.J.S. Jurat 
705 (1947); see also Stern v. Board of 
Elections, 14 Ohio St.2d 175, 181, 237 
N.E.2d 313, 317 (1968); Craig v. State, 232 
Ind. 293, 295, 112 N.E.2d 296, 297 (1953) 
(purpose is to evidence that oath was made 
before authorized officer). In view of this 
principle, because the jurat in this case 
clearly evidenced that the oath was given 
before a notary, it should be considered 
adequate. And even assuming that the 
legislature intended the inclusion of a jurat 
which conformed with the notary statute,8 
substantial compliance would certainly be 
sufficient to satisfy that requirement. 
E.g., Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 296, 
215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950). 
In this case, the jurat contained the nota-
ry's signature, the date, and her official 
seal. These items were sufficient to evi-
dence the fact that the document had been 
verified. Moreover, anyone who ques-
tioned the validity of the notarization could 
certainly confirm its authenticity with the 
simplest inquiry. Thus, we find that the 
lien's notarization substantially complied 
with the mechanic's lien and notary stat-
utes. See, e.g., Georgia Lumber Co. v. 
Harrison Constr. Co., 103 W.Va. 1, 5, 136 
S.E. 399, 401 (1927) (notice sufficient 
though notary failed to affix official seal in 
contravention of statute); Stern, 237 
N.E.2d at 317-19 (failure of notary to affix 
8. In 1989, the legislature amended the mechan-
ic's lien statute to specifically provide a particu-
lar jurat form. The current statute requires "an 
acknowledgment or certificate as required un-
der Chapter 3, Title 57." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-l-7(2)(e) (Supp.1990). 
9. We recognize that this conclusion is inconsist-
ent with In re Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (D. Utah 
1984), on which the trial court heavily relied. 
signature to jurat did not invalidate affida-
vit). 
The purpose of the verification require-
ment is to assure that lien claimants file 
legitimate claims. First Sec. Mtg., 631 
P.2d at 922; see also H.A.M.S., 563 P.2d at 
264. In First Security Mortgage and H.A. 
M.S., liens were held invalid because the 
lien notices did not contain the signature of 
the claimants but simply the signature of a 
notary attesting to the oath of the claim-
ants. Unlike with the notices in those 
cases, the president of Projects signed an 
oath that the contents of the lien notice 
were true and the notary attested to this 
fact. We see no policy reason why the 
notary's technical failure to include her ad-
dress and commission expiration date in-
creased, in any way, the likelihood that 
Projects would file a frivolous claim, espe-
cially since her failure presumably oc-
curred after the verification was signed by 
the president. 
For the above reasons, we find that the 
lien notice substantially complied with the 
"proper jurat" requirement established in 
Mickelsen.9 
B. Other Grounds 
Though we disagree with the trial court's 
legal conclusion on the notarization issue, 
we may still affirm the summary judgment 
based upon one of the other failures in the 
lien notice. The Banks argue that the lien 
notice is invalid because the metes and 
bounds description in the notice (1) covers 
more than one condominium unit without 
specifically referencing each, (2) describes 
more property than is actually subject to 
the lien, and (3) describes property which 
was not initially owned by Bradshaw and 
because the notice fails to distinguish be-
tween work completed under the two sepa-
rate contracts. 
In Williamson, the bankruptcy court found that 
each element listed in section 46-1-8 was an 
essential part of a notary's certificate even when 
made on a mechanic's lien. Id. at 823. Utah 
law was admittedly unclear on this point when 
Williamson was decided. Nonetheless, we dis-
agree with the analysis in Williamson and hold 
to the contrary. 
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These other grounds essentially chal-
lenge the descriptive contents of the lien 
notice. The purpose for descriptive terms 
in a lien notice is to adequately inform 
interested parties of the existence and 
scope of the lien. See Park City Meat Co. 
v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 
145, 155, 103 P. 254, 260 (1906); Eccles 
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 
87 P. 713, 717 (1906); see also Parsons v. 
Keeney, 98 Conn. 745, 749, 120 A. 505, 507 
(1923); Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac 
Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 490, 
700 P.2d 109, 112 (Ct.App.1985); Consol-
idated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson Elec. 
Contracting, Inc., 272 Or. 376, 382, 537 
P.2d 80, 82 (1975). Thus, courts look to see 
whether interested parties have been in-
formed of the existence of the lien and 
whether the lien has misled or prejudiced 
those parties. See Eccles, 87 P. at 717; see 
also Beall, 700 P.2d at 112; Horseshoe 
Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 
1986). When lien notices have sufficiently 
informed interested persons that a lien ex-
ists on identifiable property and the com-
plaining party has not been misled by the 
notice, the purpose of the provisions has 
not been thwarted and courts are inclined 
to find substantial compliance. See, e.g., 
Horseshoe, 713 P.2d at 781. 
[7, 8] As we analyze each of the Banks' 
challenges to the lien description, our main 
purpose is to determine whether the notice 
adequately informed the Banks of the ex-
istence of the lien and whether the Banks 
were prejudiced, as a matter of lawr, by the 
descriptive terms. "Absent any such claim 
of prejudice or being misled in any manner 
by the description[s] which [appear] in the 
lien statement, we [will] hold that it was 
sufficient." Id.10 
1. Inclusion Of More Than One Unit 
Without Designating Each 
[9] Section 38-1-7 provides, with our 
emphasis, that every notice of lien must 
contain "a description of the property to be 
charged with the lien, sufficient for identi-
*0* It is not enough for the Banks to show that 
other persons might have been prejudiced by 
the lien notice. In order to prevail, the Banks 
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fication" Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 
(Supp.1983). Section 38-1-8 provides in 
pertinent part: "Liens against two or more 
buildings . . . owned by the same person or 
persons may be included in one claim; but 
in such case the person filing the claim 
must designate therein the amount claimed 
to be due to him on each of such build-
ings." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1988). 
The Banks argue that these two sections 
require Projects to allocate its contract 
claims among all the relevant condominium 
units. 
We begin our analysis with the first of 
three cases dealing with section 38-1-8 and 
its predecessor. In Eccles Lumber Co. v. 
Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906), the 
owner of property on which a mechanic's 
lien had been filed argued that a lien notice 
was invalid because it failed to separately 
state amounts due on different structures. 
This court construed the predecessor stat-
ute to section 38-1-8, which contains lan-
guage identical to that in section 38-1-8, 
and definitively stated that a blanket lien 
was not invalid for failing to allocate the 
amounts due. Eccles, 87 P. at 717. The 
lien claimant's failure did "not affect nor 
concern the owner of the property." Id. 
He was "fairly informed of the amount 
claimed against his property." Id. Rath-
er, allocation was necessary "to protect the 
interests of the lien claimants between and 
among themselves." Id. 
The next case in which we discussed the 
issue was United States Building & Loan 
Association v. Midvale Home Finance 
Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090 (1935). 
In Midvale Home, a corporation promoted 
the construction and sale of homes in a 
subdivision. When the corporation default-
ed on its construction loan, the loan compa-
ny brought suit to foreclose its mortgage 
on the subdivision property. We were 
called upon to determine the priorities 
among the mortgage, several mechanic's 
liens, and the interests of the individual 
home purchasers. The home purchasers 
argued that they had priority over the lien 
must show that they were somehow misled or 
prejudiced. See supra note 5. 
748 Utah 798 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
claimants because the lien claimants did 
not allocate amounts due on the various 
houses constructed in the subdivision. The 
purchasers attempted to distinguish Eccles 
on the basis that Eccles involved only the 
original owner. We rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that the mechanic's liens 
"attached before any of the claims of the 
unit holders." Id. at 519, 44 P.2d at 1096. 
The final case in which we dealt with this 
subject was Utah Savings & Loan Associ-
ation v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 
598 (1961). In Mecham, a claimant filed a 
lien covering numerous subdivision lots. 
Some of the lots were owned by the Mec-
hams, and some, by another individual. 
The lien failed to allocate the amounts due 
on each lot. Mecham argued that the lien 
was invalid. We affirmed the general 
rules in Eccles and Midvale Home but con-
cluded that the lien claimant could only 
aggregate claims if the various lots and 
structures described in the lien were owned 
by the same person. 
As in Midvale Home, the Banks in this 
case acquired their interests in the proper-
ty subsequent to the time the mechanic's 
lien attached. Unlike the situation in the 
Mecham case, Bradshaw was apparently 
the only owner of the affected property 
when the lien attached, i.e., when construc-
tion started. Finally, the Banks do not 
argue that the lien misled them as to the 
claimed lien, nor have they demonstrated 
any prejudice from the aggregation of the 
claims in this case. Thus, we hold that the 
lien notice was not invalid, at least as 
against the Banks, simply because Projects 
failed to segregate the contract amounts 
attributable to individual condominium 
units. 
2. Describing More Property Than Was 
Subject To Lien 
[10,11] The Banks argue that even if 
Projects was not required to segregate the 
claims attributable to each condominium 
unit, the lien was invalid for describing 
11. At the risk of unnecessary repetition, we reit-
erate that in holding that the description does 
not invalidate the lien as to the Banks, we do 
not mean to suggest that the result would be the 
more property than was properly subject to 
the lien. However, the general rule is that 
the inclusion of 
more land than that to which the lien 
may properly attach does not vitiate the 
lien upon so much of the land as is en-
compassed within the description and to 
which a lien may properly attach, at least 
if the description is not fraudulent or 
grossly misleading and innocent third 
parties are not affected. 
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice, claim, 
or statement of Mechanic's lien with re-
spect to description or location of real 
property, 52 A.L.R.2d 12, 83 (1957); see 
also Adams Tree Serv., Inc. v. Trans-
america Title Ins. Co., 20 Ariz.App. 214. 
511 P.2d 658, 663 (1973) (valid portion of 
lien can be severed from invalid portion); 
Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac Inter-
mountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 700 P.2d 
109, 112 (Ct.App.1985) ("the land properly 
subject to the lien is for the court to deter-
mine"); Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock 
Silver Mining Co., 86 Utah 145, 103 P. 254, 
259 (1909) ("court may limit the amount [of 
land] to what may be necessary"); Horse-
shoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d at 781 
(lien which contained "no adequate descrip-
tion of the property" upheld where no 
claim of prejudice or being misled); Engle 
v. First Nat'I Bank, 590 P.2d 826, 832 
(Wyo.1979) (validating lien which described 
entire ranch rather than small parcel upon 
Which house was constructed since no 
showing of prejudice by bank). 
We are persuaded that no purpose of the 
mechanic's lien statute would be served by 
totally invalidating a lien which overdes-
cribes the property upon which the lien can 
properly attach. There is no evidence in 
the record to suggest that the description 
was fraudulent. Moreover, the Banks do 
not argue that they were misled or preju-
diced by the description. Therefore, we 
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the 
overly broad description results in the 
lien's invalidity as to the Banks.11 
same for others. The lien, for example, is inef-
fective as to the phase II property, in which the 
Banks claim no interest, and inclusion of that 
property in the lien notices would subject 
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3. Describing Property Not Initially 
Owned By Bradshaw 
[12] The Banks argue that the descrip-
tion may have included property not even 
owned by Bradshaw at the time the work 
was commenced on the project. They ar-
gue, citing Mecham, that this fact alone 
invalidates the lien. We do not think Mec-
ham stands for this proposition. In Mec-
ham, we invalidated the lien because "the 
materials, for which claim was made, were 
not furnished upon buildings owned by 
the same person or persons." 12 Utah 2d 
at 339, 366 P.2d at 601 (emphasis added). 
Here, the Banks do not argue that any of 
the materials or labor went into the con-
struction of buildings not initially owned by 
Bradshaw but simply that some of the land 
included in the notice was not owned by 
Bradshaw at the outset of construction. 
We fail to see much of a distinction for 
this case between a lien which includes too 
much property owned by the same owner 
and too much property part of which is 
owned by another person. In either event, 
the court can determine what part of the 
property is actually subject to the lien. 
Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac Inter-
mountain, Inc., 108 Idaho at 498, 700 P.2d 
at 112. Whether the other person would 
have an action for slander of title is a 
separate matter. See supra note 11. 
Again, the Banks do not complain that they 
were actually misled or prejudiced by the 
notice. Thus, under these facts, the overly 
expansive property description did not com-
promise any purpose of the statute and 
does not invalidate the lien as to the Banks. 
4. Inclusion Of Separate Contracts In 
One Lien 
The Banks also argue that the lien must 
fail because the construction work on the 
property was performed under two sepa-
rate contracts. Although the Banks ad-
vance this argument, they fail to cite much 
authority to support their position or to 
give any policy reasons for adopting such a 
rule. Utah courts have not addressed this 
question before, and there is a split of 
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authority among other jurisdictions which 
have considered it. 
[13] Some courts have held that when 
work is performed under separate con-
tracts, the work may not be aggregated 
into a single lien claim. Rather, a separate 
notice must be recorded for each contract. 
See, e.g., FA. Drew Glass Co. v. Eagle 
Mill, 1 Kan.App. 614, 42 P. 387, 390 (1895); 
Schively v. Radell, 227 Pa. 434, 441, 76 A. 
209, 211 (1910). Other jurisdictions, how-
ever, have allowed lien claimants to file a 
single notice even though the work was 
performed under more than one contract. 
See, e.g., Alabama State Fair & Agri-
cultural Ass'n v. Alabama Gas Fixture & 
Plumbing Co., 131 Ala. 256, 31 So. 26, 28 
(1901); Booth v. Pendola, 88 Cal. 36, 25 P. 
1101, 1101 (1891); Parsons v. Keeney, 98 
Conn. 745, 749, 120 A. 505, 507 (1923); 
Saint Joseph's College v. Morrison, Inc., 
158 Ind.App. 272, 302 N.E.2d 865, 874-76 
(1973); Consolidated Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. 
Jenson Elec. Contracting, Inc., 272 Or. 
376, 537 P.2d 80 (1975); Fischer v. Meiroff, 
192 Wis. 482, 484, 213 N.W. 283, 285 (1927). 
After reviewing the various cases, we 
find more persuasive the cases which have 
allowed the aggregation of claims arising 
under more than one contract. In Consol-
idated Electric, one of the comparatively 
more recent cases, the Oregon Supreme 
Court allowed a lien claimant to file a sin-
gle lien notice covering two contracts with 
separate owners. Although the court stat-
ed that it did not favor the practice, it 
noted that each owner was sufficiently no-
tified of the lien against its property and no 
"prejudice [had] been suffered by the de-
fendants in any material respect." 272 Or. 
at 383, 537 P.2d at 83. The holding of 
Consolidated Electric significantly depart-
ed from earlier Oregon case law. See, e.g., 
Dimitre Elec. Co. v. Paget, 175 Or. 72, 151 
P.2d 630 (1944). In changing its position, 
the Oregon court recognized that "the mod-
ern trend [in mechanic's lien law] is to 
dispense with arbitrary rules which have 
no demonstrable value in a particular fact 
situation." Consolidated Elec. Dist., Inc., 
272 Or. at 380, 537 P.2d at 82. 
Projects to appropriate relief in a slander of title action. See supra note 5. 
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[14] The reasoning in Consolidated 
Electric makes sense, and we adopt that 
position in this case. Again, the Banks do 
not argue that the notice failed to ade-
quately notify them of the existence of the 
lien or in any way prejudiced them. Thus, 
we hold that the inclusion of claims arising 
under two separate contracts in a single 
lien notice did not invalidate Projects' lien. 
5. Summary 
The Banks do not seriously claim that 
any of the alleged description failures mis-
led or prejudiced them. The lien notices, 
while not a model of clarity and precision, 
appear to have adequately accomplished 
the purposes of the statute as concerns the 
Banks. Thus, we hold that Projects' lien 
notice substantially complied with sections 
38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of the mechanic's lien 
statute. Accordingly, the lien is valid, at 
least as between the parties to this appeal. 
V. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN 
UNDER SECTION 57-8-19 
[15] The Banks also argue that the lien 
notice was invalid under the Condominium 
Ownership Act, which provides in pertinent 
part, with our emphasis: 
Subsequent to recording the declara-
tion as provided in this act, and while the 
property remains subject to this act, no 
lien shall thereafter arise or be effective 
against the property. During such peri-
od liens or encumbrances shall arise or 
be created only against each unit . 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19 (1953). The 
Banks argue that Projects' lien arose and 
was effective only after recordation of the 
condominium declaration. Thus, they ar-
gue, Projects was required to file a notice 
of lien for each specific condominium unit. 
Utah appellate courts have not had an 
opportunity to interpret section 57-8-19 in 
this context. However, both the Montana 
and Wisconsin Supreme Courts have inter-
preted statutes nearly identical to Utah's in 
contexts similar to this case. See Hostet-
ter v. Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167, 
561 P.2d 1323 (1977); Stevens Constr. 
Corp. v. Draper Hall, Inc., 73 Wis.2d 104, 
242 N.W.2d 893 (1976). 
The facts in Hostetter, Stevens, and the 
instant case are essentially the same. In 
each case, the developer contracted for the 
construction of condominium units and con-
struction work began. Thereafter, the de-
velopers filed condominium declarations. 
Some time later, the contractors filed me-
chanic's liens which described the entire 
property on which the condominium com-
plex was constructed and failed to allocate 
separate amounts to the different units. 
In each case, the defendants argued that a 
blanket lien over the entire project was 
inappropriate once the condominium decla-
ration had been filed. 
The courts in both Hostetter and Stevens 
held that the blanket lien was sufficient. 
Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 173, 561 P.2d at 
1326-27; Stevens, 73 Wis.2d at 114, 242 
N.W.2d at 898. Both courts noted that the 
key factor was the point when the liens 
arose and became effective against the 
property; both courts held that this oc-
curred at the commencement of construc-
tion. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 172-73, 561 
P.2d at 1326; Stevens, 73 Wis.2d at 114, 
242 N.W.2d at 898 The filing of the lien 
notice merely preserved and perfected the 
lien. Stevens, 73 Wis.2d at 114, 242 
N.W.2d at 898. The only effect that the 
condominium declaration had was to make 
the blanket lien proportionately effective 
against each unit constructed under the 
subject contract along with its correspond-
ing undivided interest in the common area. 
Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 174, 561 P.2d at 
1327; Stevens, 73 Wis 2d at 114, 242 
N.W.2d at 898. 
The Banks attempt to distinguish Hostet-
ter and Stevens. They note that, unlike 
this case, the work in those cases was done 
under a single contract. They argue that 
this fact alone should produce a different 
result, but they do not state the reasons 
for their conclusion. We have concluded 
that a lien notice may include work per-
formed under separate contracts and fail to 
see why the result should be different 
when the work is performed on a condo-
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minium project.12 
We find the reasoning in Hostetter and 
Stevens sound and adopt their rationale. 
Section 57-8-19 does not affect the validity 
of the lien in this case. The lien arose and 
became effective when Projects com-
menced work on the project. As previously 
noted, the lien notice was sufficient to per-
fect that lien, making the lien valid at least 
as to the units properly subject to the lien 
and as between the parties to this appeal. 
The only effect of section 57-8-19 and the 
intermediate filing of the declaration was 
to make the lien proportionately effective 
against each unit constructed under the 
subject contracts and each such unit's cor-
responding undivided interest in the com-
mon area. Having concluded that the lien 
notice is not facially invalid as to the 
Banks, we turn now to the separate argu-
ments presented by Valley Bank and Cot-
tonwood Thrift. 
VI. VALLEY BANK DISMISSAL 
The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to Valley Bank on the basis of Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (1988). That statute 
provides in pertinent part: 
Actions to enforce [mechanic's] liens 
must be begun within twelve months af-
ter the completion of the original con-
tract, or the suspension of work thereun-
der for a period of thirty days. Within 
the twelve months herein mentioned the 
lien claimant shall file for record with the 
county recorder of each county in which 
the lien is recorded a notice of the pend-
ency of the action, in the manner provid-
12. In Hostetter, the Montana court specifically 
noted that the blanket lien was effective against 
the entire condominium project because "the 
work was performed under one contract, and 
not a series of separate contracts for each unit." 
Hostetter v. Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167, 
170, 561 P.2d 1323, 1325 (1977). Apparently, 
Montana courts have adopted the position that a 
single lien may not encompass work performed 
under multiple contracts. See Caird Eng'g 
Works v. Seven-up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 
471, 487-89, 111 P.2d 267, 276 (1941). We have 
declined to adopt that position and thus disavow 
that aspect of the Hostetter decision. 
^ Although both parties have characterized sec-
tion 38-1-11 as a statute of limitation, we do not 
view it strictly as such. Rather, it contains one 
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ed in actions affecting the title or right 
to possession of real property, or the lien 
shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and 
persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action 
Id. 
[16] Projects commenced this action 
and recorded its lis pendens five months 
after it ceased construction, well within the 
statutory twelve-month period. It did not, 
however, add Valley Bank as a defendant 
until it filed its amended complaint, nearly 
twenty months after construction ceased. 
Valley Bank argued, and the trial court 
agreed, that section 38-1-11 is a statute of 
limitation13 which required Projects to 
name Valley Bank as a defendant within 
the twelve-month period, on pain of its ac-
tion against Valley Bank being forever 
barred. We read section 38-1-11 different-
ly. 
Section 38-1-11 has two requirements 
which serve two different purposes. First, 
the statute requires the lien claimant to 
commence his action within twelve months 
of the completion of the project or suspen-
sion of work. See supra note 13. Valley 
Bank argues that the lien claimant is also 
required by this provision to join all per-
sons having an interest in the property 
within the twelve-month period. However, 
the statute does not expressly require the 
lien claimant to do so and, on the contrary 
as hereafter explained, obviously contem-
plates the joinder of defendants not initially 
of the requirements with which the claimant 
must comply "before [that] party is entitled to 
the benefits created by the [mechanic's lien] 
statute." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & 
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). The 
penalty for not commencing an action to en-
force a mechanic's lien within the twelve-month 
period provided in section 38-1-11 is invalida-
tion of the lien rather than preclusion of the 
claim as with a traditional statute of limitation. 
See, e.g, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (Supp. 
1986). The commencement requirement of sec-
tion 38-1-11 serves as a substantive restriction 
on the lien action and, unlike a true statute of 
limitation, is not waived if not pleaded. AAA, 
714 P.2d at 291. 
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named after the expiration of the twelve-
month period. 
[17] The second ''requirement'* of sec-
tion 38-1-11 is that the hen claimant file 3 
lis pendens within the twelve-month period. 
However, the limited effect of a failure to 
comply with this requirement is expressly 
set forth in the statute. When a claimant 
fails to file the lis pendens within the 
twelve-month period, the lien itself is not 
invalidated, but rather it is rendered void 
as to everyone except those named in the 
action and those with actual knowledge of 
the action. By contrast, it follows logical-
ly, timely recordation of the lis pendens 
imparts constructive notice to all persons 
concerned with the property of the action 
to enforce the lien, see Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-40-2 (1989), regardless of whether 
they were named as parties or had actual 
knowledge of the action. 
Valley Bank's contrary interpretation 
would render portions of the statute mean-
ingless or nonsensical. See Millett v, 
Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 
(Utah 1980) ("[Statutory enactments are to 
be so construed as to render all parts there-
of relevant and meaningful, and that inter-
pretations are to be avoided which render 
some part of a provision nonsensical or 
absurd."). For one thing, it would be 
pointless to provide that a lien would be 
valid as against persons with actual knowl-
edge of the action to enforce the lien who 
had not been named as parties in the action 
as filed within the twelve-month period un-
less it were fully anticipated that such par-
ties could be brought into the action, by 
amendment, beyond the twelve-month peri-
od. It would make no sense to consider the 
lien to be valid as against such persons 
unless it could be enforced against them by 
14. It is worth noting that even if Projects had 
not recorded its lis pendens timely, Valley Bank 
would still be subject to the lien because it had 
actual knowledge of Projects' action by no later 
than August 1984, when it reviewed a title re-
port disclosing the action and commenced a 
dialogue with Projects concerning the matter. 
15. Although Valley Bank directs our attention to 
California and Illinois decisions holding that a 
lien claimant may in no event add defendants 
after expiration of the dealine for filing a me-
chanic's lien action, we are not persuaded by 
'.- joining them in the action as previously 
commenced. Moreover, failure to join a 
,. defendant in the complaint as filed within 
2 the twelve-month period cannot be conclu-
sively fatal to the claimant's ability to en-
} force the lien as against the defendant or it 
T would be meaningless for the statute to 
j. refer to the continued effectiveness of the 
lien, even absent timely recordation of a lis 
•: pendens, as against non-parties, like Valley 
I Bank in this case, who have actual knowl-
5 edge of the action. 
f [18,19] We conclude that section 38-1-
11 should be read as a whole to require a 
\ lien claimant to commence a mechanic's 
> lien action and record a corresponding lis 
1 pendens within the twelve-month period. 
Commencing the action preserves the lien. 
Recording the lis pendens imparts con-
[ structive notice of the lien enforcement ac-
tion to everyone interested in the liened 
L property. Only when the claimant fails to 
timely record the lis pendens can an inter-
ested person argue that it is not subject to 
the lien, and then only if such person was 
not named as a party and did not have 
actual knowledge of the action. 
[20] In this case, Projects commenced 
the action and filed the lis pendens within 
the required twelve-month period. Valley 
Bank was therefore subject to the lien14 
and could properly be joined by an appro-
priate amendment to the complaint as was 
done in this case. The trial court accord-
ingly erred when it dismissed Valley Bank 
from the action.15 
VII. AMBIGUITY OF "PARTIAL" 
LIEN RELEASE 
The trial court granted Cottonwood 
Thrift & Loan Company's summary judg-
ment motion on two grounds: First, the 
those decisions. As previously noted, unlike 
California and Illinois statutes, section 38-1-11 
is not a true statute of limitation. See supra 
note 13. Moreover, our statute is significantly 
different from the statutes in California and 
Illinois because it does not merely impose a 
deadline for commencement of the action, but 
goes on to delineate persons who will be subject 
to the lien even though not joined in the action 
within the twelve-month period. Our attention 
is drawn to no decision construing similar lan-
guage in any other mechanic's lien statute. 
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court concluded that, "based on undisputed 
facts," Cottonwood Thrift had reasonably 
relied upon the recorded lien release. Sec-
ond, the court concluded that the effect of 
the release was clear on its face. Projects 
argues on appeal that the release was am-
biguous. It also argues that reasonable 
reliance is a concept necessarily too fact-
sensitive for disposition by summary judg-
ment. 
[21] Whether a contract is ambiguous 
is a question of law. E.g., Morris v. Moun-
tain States Tel & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 
1200 (Utah 1983). Moreover, the trial court 
must determine "whether a contract is am-
biguous . . . before it takes any evidence in 
clarification." Id. It follows, therefore, 
that if the contract is clear on its face, the 
trial court need not—and in fact should 
not—consider evidence of a contrary mean-
ing. 
[22-24] The release in this case stated 
in pertinent part that Projects "in consider-
ation of [$90,000] . . . does hereby release, 
satisfy and discharge that certain claim of 
lien . . . against the following described 
real property." The release then described 
units 4 and 5. This language is susceptible 
of no other interpretation but that the two 
units were completely released from the 
scope of the lien.16 The trial court properly 
construed the release as a matter of law 
and properly declined to consider evidence 
of another intent. Consequently, we af-
firm the trial court's decision to dismiss 
Cottonwood Thrift from the action.17 
16. Projects argues that the release was ambigu-
ous because the word "Partial" was added to the 
"Release of Lien" heading. However, in the 
context of this case, the release clearly was 
"partial" because it only released two of the 
eight units otherwise covered by the lien notice. 
We do not believe that the addition created any 
ambiguity in the instrument. 
In the determination of the real character of a 
contract, courts will always look to its pur-
pose rather than to the name given it by the 
parties, and where a conflict exists between a 
name attempted to be applied to a particular 
contract and the language of the contract it-
self, the name will be rejected as inapplicable. 
17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 269 (1964) (footnote 
omitted). 
17. Because we agree that the release was clear 
and was not ambiguous, we need not address 
Projects' reasonable reliance arguments. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order and judgment of 
dismissal are affirmed only as they relate 
to Cottonwood Thrift.18 As to Copper 
State and Valley Bank, we reverse and 
remand for trial or other appropriate pro-
ceedings consistent with this decision. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified 
herself, does not participate herein; 
GREGORY K. ORME, Court of Appeals 
Judge, sat. 
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Town brought action against home-
owners to determine certain water rights, 
18. The Banks request on appeal that we award 
attorney fees based upon Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-18 (1988), which provides: "In any ac-
tion brought to enforce any lien under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed 
by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action." In view of our holding, except as con-
cerns Cottonwood Thrift, determination of any 
party's "success" is clearly premature. In the 
case of Cottonwood Thrift, we note that it, along 
with the other banks, did not request attorney 
fees as part of its motion for summary judg-
ment. We will not entertain issues raised for 
the first time on appeal. Zions First Nat'l Bank 
v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 657 
(Utah 1988). Therefore, we decline to consider 
Cottonwood Thrift's request for fees even 
though it has successfully defeated Projects' 
claims against it. 
